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Turkish sports diplomacy in the
service of renewed power? The uses
and limits of Turkey’s “sport power”
Jean-François Polo
1 For the first time in its fifteen years of brilliant yet unsuccessful candidacies to host the
Olympic  Games  (OG)  and  the  Football  European Championships  (Euro),  Turkey  was
admitted  into  the  elite  group  of  countries  capable  of  staging  sports  mega-events.
Although it failed in the last round for the 2020 Olympic Games (beaten by Tokyo in
2013), and for the Euro 2016 (beaten by France in 2010), it has since been tipped as the
strong favourite to host Euro 2024. International matches have been simultaneously
utilized  by  the  Turkish  government  as  an  opportunity  to  publicly  demonstrate  its
willingness  to  resolve  historically  problematic  issues  with  other  countries,  notably
Armenia, Greece, and Syria. It will be argued that Turkey’s ambitions to host sports
mega-events and its politicization of specific matches (against Syria and Armenia) can
be interpreted as a strategy of the state to diffuse a positive image at home and abroad,
and consolidate its role in the region.
2 This issue aims to assess the applicability of Nye’s (2004) concept of soft power to a
description and explanation of Turkey’s foreign policy and its regional impact in the
last decade. It is tempting to participate in this debate by focusing on the political uses
of sport. Nye’s concept of soft power has been frequently employed in studies seeking
to establish a correlation between the growth of international influence and the use of
sports  diplomacy,  including  hosting  sports  mega-events  and  achieving  national
recognition through sporting success. This approach raises the question of the links
between sport and politics, a theme that is as recurrent in common reasoning as it is in
the academic field.1 
3 Before  outlining  the  limitations  of  Nye’s  concept  of  soft  power,  the  relationship
between sport and politics will be firstly considered. Although the neutrality of sport is
often claimed by the sporting world (Defrance 2000) through statements asserting its
difference from politics,  numerous potential  implications of  the impact  of  sport  on
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political  issues remain (Polo 2005),  and particularly from an International Relations
perspective. According to Pierre Milza (1984), the international significance of sport
encompasses three areas: Sport as a part of and reflecting the international stage; sport
as a signifier of public feeling; and sport as a means of foreign policy. It is the latter
dimension  of  sport  as  an  instrument  of  foreign  policy  that  requires  elaboration  in
relation to Nye’s concept. International competitions continue to constitute a quest for
the recognition of national power (Elias and Dunning 1994: 307). Numerous examples
across history have illustrated the ways in which states have striven to demonstrate
their power through the achievement of international sporting success (Boniface 2002;
Houlihan 1994). International sport is deeply impregnated with nationalism, which has
often reached spectacular degrees. From Nazi propaganda in the 1936 OG (Brohm 1983)
to the Beijing Games in 2008 (Collectif anti-Jeux olympiques 2008), the consequences of
the political  uses  of  sport  has  served at  best  to  boost  national  pride,  and at  worst
encouraged nationalism. However, international sport has not only been a means used
by states to show off their power,2 it can also simply be a way of achieving international
recognition of its existence and increasing legitimacy. International sports authorities,
such  as  the  International  Olympic  Committee  (IOC),  the  Football  International
Federation Association (FIFA), and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA),
have  the  capacity  to  act  as  effective  parallel  channels  for  international  diplomacy.
Awarding the organization of an international sports mega-event to a country, such as
the Football World Cup or the OG, signifies international recognition, the implications
of which is amply demonstrated by the fierce competitiveness of candidate countries.
Events  have  been  utilized  by  authoritarian  states  as  a  means  of  legitimizing  their
political systems, or at least improving their international appeal, as can be argued in
the cases of the Argentinian FIFA World Cup in 1978 and the Moscow Olympic Games in
1980.  In  other  contexts,  fulfilment  of  the  bid  criteria  represents  an  implicit
acknowledgement of the high standard of development attained by a country, such as
the  OG  in  Seoul,  1988,  Barcelona,  1992,  Athens,  2004,  and  Rio,  2016.  Similarly,  the
political progress of South Africa’s peaceful transition from apartheid was translated
into recognition by FIFA through its award of the 2010 World Cup.
4 Studies of sport as a diplomatic tool frequently cite the concept of soft power (Gillon
2011; Freeman 2012; Champagne 2012; Huish, Carter and Darnell 2013). However, the
majority of the time the assumed relevance of the term is employed without sufficient
appraisal  of  its  practical  applicability.  References  to  the  definition  of  soft  power
developed by Nye usually offer case studies that claim sport to be an efficient medium
of  soft  power  in  the  international  arena,  but  without  elaboration through relevant
supporting examples. Other authors have argued for a more strategic use of soft power,
even urging its exercise in a more prescriptive way (Verschuuren 2013). Nye himself
argues that as part of popular culture “sport can play a role in communicating values…
National Basketball games are broadcast to 750 million households in 212 countries and
42 languages. Major League Baseball games flow to 224 countries in 11 languages. The
National Football League’s Super Bowl attracted an estimated 800 million viewers in
2003. The number of sport viewers rivals the 7.3 billion viewers worldwide who went to
see America movies in 2002” (Nye 2004: 47). For Nye soft power is defined as “the ability
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye 2004:
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x). However, use of the term soft power to denote the instrumentalization of sport in
foreign policy evokes critical questions around two main issues:
• The first relates to the actors that constitute the soft power of sport (i.e. the states, sports
federations, and athletes) and whether they share the same expectations. The preeminent
actors, the way in which they interact with one another, and their international role in sport
firstly requires determining.
• The second question concerns the relationship between national success and mega-events
and any subsequent benefits that could be achieved in terms of foreign policy, for example,
to what extent has the Super Bowl has had a positive impact on the image of the United
States?  Furthermore,  the  way  in  which  the  desirability  of  a  country  might  be  affected
requires consideration, that is, whether the concept of soft power offers a useful approach
to analyse, for example, the successes of the Beijing OG, 2008 or Sotchi OG, 2014.3 
5 The concept of soft power should be approached with a great degree of caution. As Jean
Leca has suggested it is an “uncertain concept” (Leca 2013) due to its polysemy and
concrete uses, since soft power is often only considered as an attribute of powerful
countries with the capacity to mobilize hard power. Undoubtedly, over that last decade
Turkey has tried to manoeuvre its position to increase its regional influence, largely
thanks  to  its  economic  growth and its  relationship  with  the  European Union (EU),
despite  the  ongoing  ambiguities  of  the  membership  process.  In  particular,  the
government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has endeavoured to develop
the means and arguments for asserting its regional power, in all probability feeding a
collective imaginary drawing on the nostalgia  of  the former power of  the Ottoman
Empire, albeit the pursuit of a neo-Ottoman strategy is refuted by Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Notwithstanding the recent tumultuous developments, Turkey has played a significant
part in the Middle Eastern political scene over the last few years. Yet, how is its relative
influence to be evaluated? Can it  be asserted with certainty that Turkey’s  so-called
positive regional image has enhanced its interstate relationships to the extent that it
has enabled decisions to be made in its favour? And if so, what were the desired images
that the Turkish authorities intended to promote and what role have they played?
6 In  this  paper,  I  will  make  a  distinction  between the  use  of  sport,  more  accurately
football matches, as a tool of diplomacy (in which the state remains the main actor of
the process in the context of bilateral relationships) and the use of sports events which
includes  also  the  involvement  of  sports  actors  for  more  diffuse  ends.  Rather  than
referring to the concept of soft power, the notion of sports diplomacy will be utilised in
the first part to analyse Turkey’s influence through the strategic use of sport:
Today sports diplomacy is associated with governments employing sports people to
amplify a diplomatic message, or with states using sporting events to enhance their
image among global publics, to cool tensions in flagging diplomatic relationships,
or  simply  to  test  the  ground  for  a  possible  policy  change.  Sports  diplomacy
transcends cultural differences and creates opportunities for alternate avenues for
overcoming  hostilities,  official  dialogue  and  people-to-people  relations,  uniting
separate  nations  through  a  love  of  sports.  More  specifically,  sports  diplomacy
involves representative and diplomatic activities undertaken by sports people on
the behalf of, and in conjunction with, their governments (Murray 2013: 12). 
7 Thus,  sports  diplomacy  may  be  understood  as  a  policy  implemented  by  political
authorities  to  rationally  and  strategically  exploit  football matches  and  its  media
coverage in order to achieve its diplomatic goals. In the second part of the paper, mega-
event bids, and particularly the Istanbul OG bid, will be analysed as a more complex use
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of sports diplomacy. Indeed, the political uses of sports exemplified through the bid
process  reveals  the  degree  of  collusion  that  occurs  between  political,  sport,  and
economic  elites  for  the  promotion  of  state  and  individual  interests.  Specifically,
through  the  comparative  analysis  of  successive  bid  proposals  to  host  the  Istanbul
Games, the AKP’s strategy to promote Turkey’s image will be critically appraised. 
8 The study is based on interviews, newspaper analysis, and personal observations that I
have  carried  out  in  Turkey  throughout  the  last  fifteen  years.  While  reluctance  to
discuss their activities has problematized the sociological  analysis of  interview data
gathered from diplomats – a comparatively less restrictive issue with sports authorities
– the media has been crucial to the study, not only as a source of information, but
primarily  as  a  raw  material  itself.  Of  particular  relevance to  the  methodological
approach undertaken in this paper is the active involvement of the national media in
the political strategy of sports diplomacy, which has aimed to increase the prestige and
recognition of the Nation. Sporting events facilitate broad media and public consensus
as a result of the support of pro-government newspapers and because of the difficulties
the opposition media face in criticizing events, which create a sense of pride and often
feed off a strong sense of nationalism.4 Indeed, only in the wake of the Gezi events5 in
June 2013 did some rare media commentary emerge welcoming the failure of Istanbul
2020. In a sense, rather than focusing on sports diplomacy in policy-making per se, this
paper critically examines the significance of its uses and implementation through the
provision of specific case examples.
 
I. The strategic use of sport: Sport as a tool of
diplomacy in interstate bilateral relations 
9 This section analyses the way in which sport as a diplomatic tool is conceptualised and
used by political authorities. As Norbert Elias (1994) has asserted, sport has the capacity
to  euphemize  the  political  competition  and  rivalry  that  exists  between  nations.
However, the strategic positioning of sport to resolve political problems illustrates its
more expansive role than the euphemization described by Elias. By emphasizing the
symbolic signification of certain matches and appealing to the goodwill of the populace
for reconciliation through sport, political authorities are able to display their capacity
to overcome a political impasse. In this process, the state is the main actor and sport
becomes the tool for unlocking difficult situations, or at least functions as the means of
facilitating  bilateral  interstate  relationships.  The  most  famous  example  of  sports
diplomacy is the Ping-Pong diplomacy between China and the United States in 1971,
which eventually led to the first official visit to the People’s Republic of China by an
American  president  (Xu  2008).  This  use  of  sports  often  occurs  through  matches
between two national teams within the framework of bilateral interstate relations.
10 In the last decade, Turkish authorities have utilized the opportunity offered by sporting
competitions  between the  teams of  countries with  historically  difficult  relations  to
display its benevolence towards reconciliation. However, the question is raised as to
the  intended  ends  of  these  strategies.  There  are  multiple  possible  explanations:
national security concerns over its borders, a means of demonstrating its compliance
with EU membership requirements, or alternatively, an act made by a regional power
demonstrating  its  commitment  and  generosity  towards  populations  outside  of  its
borders.  Participation  in  international  sports  matches  have  provided  opportune
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occasions for the implementation of Turkey’s “zero-problem with neighbours policy”,
developed by the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. The way in which the government
appropriates these events will be outlined before the effectiveness of the strategic use
of sports diplomacy is assessed.
 
From Aleppo to Yerevan, the capacity to use sport as a diplomacy
tool: Scoring goals
11 Turkey’s strategic use of sport as a tool of diplomacy was observable in two recent
football  events:  The  friendly  Aleppo  match  between  Fenerbahçe  of  Turkey  and  Al-
Ittihad  of  Syria  in  2007;  and  secondly,  the  two  football  matches  held  between  the
Turkish  and  Armenian  national  football  teams  in  2008  and  2009  respectively.  The
matches represented an occasion for the demonstration of Turkey’s goodwill towards
establishing  relations  with  its  former  enemies,  a  strategy  that  corresponded  to  its
wider aim of strengthening its role in the region.
 
Aleppo, April 2007
12 On the April 3, 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan joined Syrian President Bashar-al-Assad in
Aleppo to watch a friendly match between Turkey’s Fenerbahçe and Syria’s Al-Ittihad
to mark the opening of the new stadium. According to Today’s Zaman (April 2, 2007),
Erdoğan convinced Fenerbahçe officials to hold the match after receiving a personal
request  from Assad.  Occurring during a  period of  comparative stability  in  Turkish-
Syrian relations, the match provided an advantageous occasion to publicly demonstrate
the progress of reconciliation that had been achieved by the two countries. Up until the
1990s, relations had remained particularly tense, dominated by water disputes – Syria
complained that Turkey’s massive development program in the border region, which
included dams, power plants and irrigation systems, diverted valuable water resources
away from its agricultural lands – and Syria’s support for Kurdistan Workers’  Party
(PKK), the separatist movement fighting for an autonomous Kurdish region in Turkey.
Although escalating to the brink of war, the arrest of the PKK leader Öcalan in 1998
following  his  expulsion  from  Syria  facilitated  a  diplomatic  opening  for  a  dramatic
strategic  realignment,  including  a  period  of  cooperation between the  county’s  new
leaders Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad from 2002 to 2010. Under Turkey’s
new “zero problem policy with neighbours,” Erdoğan’s government sought to pursue
investment opportunities in Syria and secure assurances from Damascus regarding the
PKK. For his part, Assad required new allies in the context of renewed tension with the
United States over Syria’s role in Iraq and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Turkey was playing a
mediatory  role  between Syria  and the  international  community  concerning  Syrian-
Israeli  relations.  Regular  visits  between  both  leaders  were  continued  until  the
invitation was extended from Assad to Erdoğan for the stadium opening. 
13 Despite difficulties in accessing direct information about the organization of the match,
it nevertheless remains important to bear in mind that it was the direct product of a
political decision in so far as the prospect of the two teams being drawn in a match
against  each  other  were  impossible  given  that  they  belonged  to  different  regional
football  federations;  Turkey to UEFA and Syria to the Asian Football  Confederation.
According to  the mainstream Turkish media,  the match was  a  friendly watched by
75,000 supporters  inside the stadium and 150,000 outside in  celebration of  the two
Turkish sports diplomacy in the service of renewed power? The uses and limits...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 21 | 2015
5
countries  and  its  leaders  with  slogans  and  flags.6 At  a  press  conference  held  in
anticipation  of  the  Aleppo  ally,  Erdoğan emphasized  the  strength  of  historical  and
cultural  ties  that  existed  between  the  countries  and  reiterated  the  capacity  of  the
match to foster relations and intensify contact between their populations. He went on
to  welcome “the  unbelievable  friendship  wind  blowing  from a  country  with  which
Turkey  had  been  on  the  verge  of  a  war”  (Cemiloğlu  April  4,  2007).  Erdoğan  was
accompanied by his wife and the Minister of Energy and the Minister for Women and
Family Affairs. Ahead of the game signs of friendship were signalled as Assad pledged
their  mutual  support  of  the  opposing  team.  An  official  meeting  was  held  at  the
presidential palace in Aleppo to correspond with the match and facilitate discussion
about regional geopolitical issues – Iran and Lebanon, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and
energy trade – and the promotion of bilateral ties. Future possibilities for cooperation
on  natural  gas,  water  and  energy  trade  were  explored,  including  the  planned
construction of a joint dam project on Orontes [Asi] river: “A friendship dam.” (Çetin
April 4, 2007) Therefore, it can be argued that the Aleppo match offers a useful example
of the instrumentalization of sport by political authorities for the benefit of its leaders.
The event and its media coverage were utilized as platforms for the public affirmation
of the political will behind the desire to overcome past tensions and build new forms of
co-operation.  With regard to Turkey,  the visit  coincided with a  favourable  political
climate towards a Syrian rapprochement.  The match served to endorse Davutoğlu’s
doctrine  and  strengthened  Turkey’s  regional  image.  Between  2008  and  2009,  after
Erdoğan made a stance against Israel, the Turkish Prime Minister continued to promote
a positive image of Turkey in the Middle East, or at least until the events of the Arab
spring played out. In the Aleppo case, the political exploitation of the match served to
engender an image of peace. However, although these benefits were the cumulative
product  of  diplomatic  overtures,  the  match  failed  to  have  a  significant  impact  on
Turkish-Syrian  relations.  On  the  contrary,  the  example  of  the  Turkish-Armenian
football matches discussed below is a very different case.
 
Turkey-Armenia football matches, 2008 and 2009
14 While  points  of  comparison may be drawn with the Aleppo match,  the example of
Turkey  and  Armenia  offers  an  alternative  understanding  of  the  uses  of  sports
diplomacy. In particular, three notable points of departure can be discerned: Firstly,
the occurrence of the Turkey-Armenia football matches were not of pre-determined by
politics;  secondly,  they were held in  the context  of  non-existent  official  diplomatic
relationships; and thirdly, the Armenian issue constituted a critical political issue for
Turkey at both domestic and international level.
15 An intervention of fate resulted in the drawing of Turkey and Armenia in the same
group  for  the  qualifying  rounds  of  the  2010  FIFA  World  Cup  (European  zone),  the
matches scheduled to be played in Armenia, 2008, and Turkey, 2009. However, since
Armenia’s establishment as an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet
Union  in  1991, the  two states  had  no  official  diplomatic  relationships.  In  addition,
Turkey’s territorial border with Armenia had been unilaterally blocked since 1993, in
reaction to international pressure for the recognition of the Armenian genocide, and in
expression of  Turkey’s  solidarity with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue,
Armenia’s occupation of a fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory. Although in all likelihood the
matches  would  have  continued  irrespective  of  the  diplomatic  situation,  Turkish-
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Armenian  relations  entered  an  unprecedented  period  of  conciliation  from  2008.
According to Cheterian (2010: 39-40), four new elements contributed to the resumption
of dialogue. Firstly, in August 2008, the Turkish AKP government launched its “regional
stability and cooperation platform in the Caucasus” as an instrument of its new foreign
policy  orientated  towards  its  eastern  borders.  Ankara  wanted  to  be  perceived  as  a
peacemaker and subsequently sought opportunities to expand its influence in the East
and South. The objectives of the policy were inconsistent with the continued blockade
of  Armenia  and  the  refusal  to  establish  diplomatic  relations.  Secondly,  during  his
presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged to recognize the Armenian genocide and
the  new  American  administration  pressed  Ankara  to  normalize  its  relations  with
Armenia. Thirdly, the desire to improve its problematized image in the wake of the
Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, resulted in the favourable modification of Russia’s
strategic  position  towards  a  Turkish-Armenian  rapprochement.  Finally,  and  by  no
means  least,  following  the  election  of  Serzh  Sargsyan,  as  Armenian  President  in
February 2008, it was announced that he wanted to initiate new relations with Turkey
and establish an Armenian opening. Actually this latter point might have constituted
the decisive factor in triggering the football diplomacy. Elected under the suspicion of
committing fraud, Sargsyan had been resolutely criticised by western governments, the
EU, and non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, for the bloody
repression that followed his controversial election. According to Galstyan (2010: 246),
the Armenian President had to find an original means of legitimizing his presidency
and credibility in the eyes of his international critics. Within this context, initiating a
process of conciliation with Turkey and creating an Armenian opening with the West
were crucial factors in the consolidation of his position (and besides which the Turkish
issue had been a key campaign point of his presidential rival). During a Moscow state
visit  on  June  23,  2008,  Sargsyan  surprised  the  international  community  with  an
invitation  to  his  Turkish  counterpart,  Abdullah  Gül,  to  attend  the  Turkey-Armenia
World Cup qualifying match in Yerevan. The official invitation was delivered two weeks
later via a Wall Street Journal article: 
And just as the people of China and the United States shared enthusiasm for ping-
pong before their governments fully normalized relations, the people of Armenia
and Turkey are united in their love for football – which prompts me to extend the
following invitation.  On September 6,  a  World Cup qualifier  match between the
Armenian and Turkish national football teams will take place in Yerevan. I hereby
invite President Gül to visit Armenia to enjoy the match together with me in the
stadium. Thus, we will announce a new symbolic start in our relations. (Sargsyan
July 9, 2008)
16 The question of attendance provoked fierce debate in Turkey throughout the summer
among political actors, intellectuals, and “civil society” (Polo 2012a). The leaders of the
main  political  opposition  parties,  the  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  and  the
Nationalist  Movement  Party  (MHP),  argued  that  this  so-called  invitation  should  be
declined.  However,  Erdoğan,  pro-government  newspapers,  and  liberal  intellectuals
broadly supported the gesture, with some even urging Gül to pay a visit to the Genocide
Monument in the Armenian capital. At first, the Turkish president reserved his reply
by specifying that he would study with benevolence this invitation. While he had not
given his officially answer, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan indicated on September 1st
that Gül  would travel  to Yerevan.  Finally,  on September 3rd Gül  announced that he
accepted the invitation of  President Sargsyan to visit  Yerevan and to attend to the
match.  In  a  statement,  Prime  Minister  Erdoğan  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  Gül’s
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acceptance. In underlining the potentially negative consequences of refusal, Erdoğan
lends creditability to the sports diplomacy dimension of the invitation: 
President Gül’s decision to accept or reject an invitation from Armenia will have a
considerable impact on the improvement or deterioration of Turkey’s image in the
international  arena.  If  he  had  declined  to  go  to  Yerevan,  everyone would  have
criticized Turkey for  refusing to improve its  ties  with Armenia.  If  Armenia had
ulterior motives when inviting Gül to the soccer game, then Gül spoiled their plan
by  accepting  the  invitation  […].  If  the  first  dimension  of  Gül’s  planned  visit  to
Armenia is to improve ties with this country, the second dimension is the Caucasus
platform. (Ünal September 6, 2008)
17 Thus,  Gül,  accompanied  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  became  the  first  ever
Turkish President to make an official visit in Armenia in 2008. The visit, comprising
joint meetings in addition to the match, took care to avoid any potentially contentious
political issues; the visit was to resolutely convey an image of mutual peace and cordial
dialogue.  For  example,  although  taking  place  during  the  holy  month  of  Ramadan,
President Gül suspended his fast in honour of the pre-match meal offered by President
Sargsyan. The two Presidents exchanged signs of mutual friendship and benevolence.
The pretext of the game opened an unprecedented dialogue in daylight, making almost
forget that the contacts had never been completely suspended. Following the match,
the symbolic significance of Gül’s visit was perpetuated by the media and politicians.
The  political  import  of  the  event  totally  eclipsed  the  football  event,  including  the
national  win achieved by the Turkish team. Before his  departure,  Gül  returned the
invitation to President Sargsyan to attend the away match in Turkey in 2009.
18 Although  the  two  cases  presented  above  are  indicative  of  the  presence  of  sports
diplomacy in a manner reminiscent of Ping-Pong diplomacy, they in fact exemplify two
very different uses of sports diplomacy. In the case of the Aleppo match, the official
process of reconciliation had already been initiated prior to the meeting; the event was
therefore organized as a symbolic demonstration of this process as a tool of real power.
Conversely, and comparable to the situation that had existed between the United States
and China, Turkey had no diplomatic relationships with Armenia. The draw therefore
presented an opportunity for the dramatic reversal of this situation, offering a pretext
for  the  initiation of  an  official  process  of  reconciliation.  Here,  sport  operates  as  a
performative  diplomatic  tool  transcending  its  symbolic  value.  In  a  constructivist
perspective (Wendt, 1995), it contributes – or at the very least marks an attempt – to
redefine  the  mutual  interests  of  state  parties,  facilitating  new  opportunities  and
constraints  in  their  bilateral  relations.  In  the  following  section,  the  impact  of
diplomacy on Turkey’s regional position and influence will be examined.
 
Football diplomacy challenged by realpolitik: Game over 
19 Assessing the impact of diplomatic strategies is a complex endeavour because of the
different  parameters  of  impact  (domestic  and  international),  the  difficulties  of
measuring the extent of impact, and the variable temporalities of impact in terms of its
short and long-term outcomes. In addition, judging sports diplomacy to be a failure
would be misguided since instruments of traditional diplomacy may prove to be equally
unsuccessful.  A  final  point  for  consideration  is  the  evolving  nature  of  the  political
environment,  which has  the capacity  to  radically  alter  the balance of  international
relations in favourable or negative ways, particularly given recent events in the region.
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20 The prospect of Turkey taking advantage of its growing economic and political growth
to assert its position as a regional power remains not only contingent on the conduct of
its foreign policy, but on potential and emerging regional and international dynamics
on which  it  does  not  have  any grip.  Turkey’s  remarkable  reconciliation  with  Syria
offers a case in point. While the freeze in bilateral relations experienced a period of
thaw, including the initiation of cooperative projects and the belief that Turkey could
play an intermediary role in the Israeli-Syrian conflict, the Arab revolts presented a
profound  challenge  to  Davutoğlu’s  strategy.  The  Aleppo  match  represented  a
celebration of reconciliation as a mutually self-serving process largely conducted in
pursuit  of  the interests of its  leaders.  However,  decline into civil  war following the
Syrian revolt  in  2011 and Turkey’s  ensuing support  of  the opposition,  considerably
altered relations. Yet, it would be misguided to assume that this unfolding of events
represented  a  failure  of  sports  diplomacy.  Rather,  the  Aleppo  match  offers  an
understanding of sports diplomacy reduced to its simplistic expression of an extension
of friendship. 
21 Conversely, it could be argued that the matches between Turkey and Armenia had a
real diplomatic impact, at least in the short-term. The European Union and the United
States publicly supported Gül’s visit to Armenia (Today’s Zaman September 5, 2008). Olli
Rehn,  the  European  Commissioner  for  Enlargement,  warmly  welcomed  the  visit,
humorously adding that if Turkey played in Yerevan as it had in Euro 2008, “it would
cause a new diplomatic incident.” (Hürriyet Daily News September 6, 2008; Rehn October
13, 2008). International acknowledgement of the visit was marked in other ways. The
Monaco based Peace and Sport organization distinguished Turkey and Armenia with
the  “Peace  and  Sport  Image  of  the  Year  Award”  on  December  4,  2008,  for  the
photograph of the historic handshake between Gül and Sargsyan taken at the Yerevan
match as embodiment of the image of fraternization through sport.  The award was
jointly presented to the Armenian Minister of Youth and Sport and the President of the
Turkish Football Federation.7 In the following year, the FIFA Fair Play Award, 2008, was
presented to the respective Football Associations of Armenia and Turkey in recognition
of  their  part  in  facilitating  dialogue  between  two  countries  with  otherwise  absent
diplomatic relations (Fifa [2008]). 
22 Notwithstanding  the  historic  accomplishments  of  Yerevan,  the  most  momentous
outcomes were achieved in the political events that followed, without which the visit
would have remained a simple meeting of state representatives and limited to a basic
level of diplomatic exchange. What assumes significance here, therefore, is that the
pretext of the match and the Gül’s trip to Yerevan allowed the Armenian President
apply diplomatic pressure to ensure on Turkey by conditioning his  presence at  the
return match to the signing of two diplomatic protocols. The protocols envisaged the
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  and  the  founding  of  an  intergovernmental
commission  to  address  the  political  issues  that  existed  between the  two countries,
including the institution of a sub-commission on history. Of course,  the negotiation
process  sparked  a  harsh  backlash  from  the  Armenian  diaspora,  the  Armenian
opposition, Azerbaijan, and nationalist circles in Turkey. The content of the protocols
was passionately debated in both countries and negotiators had difficulty in reaching
an acceptable compromise that would be agreeable to both parties. President Sargsyan,
irritated by the slowness of the discussions, declared at the end of July 2009, “I will only
accept this invitation if previously made agreements are fulfilled, if there are real steps.
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I will visit Turkey if we have reopened the borders and if we are on the verge of an end
to the blockade” (Hürriyet  Daily  News July  29,  2009).  As  for  the  visit  of  the  Turkish
President to Armenia the previous year, the presence of Armenian President for the
return match on 14 October 2009 became an issue for the two actors but in a different
context: in 2009, the symbol of the match (and the visit of Sargsyan) must be preceded
by  diplomatic  agreements.  Indeed,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  symbol  creates  a
diplomatic  constraint.  However,  the  contested  content  of  the  protocols  created
political fracture lines and tensions continued to remain high in both countries and in
Azerbaijan. The protocol was finally signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009. The terms
stipulated the opening of the borders post-ratification and engagement in Zurich the
protocol which stipulates the next opening of the borders (once the protocol ratified by
both parties) and the implementation of “a dialogue on the historical dimension with
the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial
scientific  examination  of  the  historical  records  and  archives  to  define  existing
problems  and  formulate  recommendations”  (Protocol [October  10,  2009]).  Sargsyan
attended the return match between Turkey and Armenia on October 14, 2009, alongside
President Gül,  who declared that  “Turkey and Armenia are not  writing history but
making  history”  (Kanlı  October  14,  2009). Therefore,  in  a  context  of  non-existent
official  diplomatic  relations  and  where  a  meeting  of  heads  of  state  was  highly
improbable, the matches created a valuable opportunity for staging a commitment to
reconciliation at the highest level.
23 Seeking a definitive answer to the question of which signatory gained the most out of
the protocols is difficult to ascertain. Both states moved to secure their own interests:
On the one hand, Armenia, having initiated the process, obtained the promise of the
opening of the border; while on the other hand, Turkey capitalized on the process by
publicly demonstrating, especially to the EU, its readiness to engage in a process of
dialogue and reconciliation.  As  France was  holding the rotating presidency,  French
President  Sarkozy welcomed the protocols  on behalf  of  the EU as  “courageous and
historic”, later praising Turkish efforts to reach a peace deal between Israel and Syria
at the Damascus summit.  However,  such benevolent rhetoric did little to indicate a
fundamental change to Sarkozy’s oppositional position vis-à-vis Turkey’s EU candidacy.
In addition, the prospective long-term success of the reconciliation process remains
uncertain due to the failure to ratify the protocols and implement its terms, including
the opening of the borders. In this regard, Azerbaijan has played a critical role as the
real  referee  of  the  match,  its  relations  with  Turkey  pivotal  to  the  progress  of
normalizing relations with Armenia.  As a result  of  its  cultural  ties and the issue of
energy, Turkey has been ill able to afford alienating its key strategic partner in the
Caucasus.  Irritated  by the  rapprochement  between  Turkey and  Armenia, Azeri
President Aliyev put pressure on his Turkish allies to mobilize Ankara into securing a
resolution  on  the  Armenian  occupation  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  as  the  sine qua  non
condition of the ratification of the Turkish-Armenian protocols.8
24 However, at the domestic level it can be argued that the real outcome of the match has
been  the  lifting  of  the  Armenian  taboo  in  Turkey  (Polo  2013).  Debates  concerning
relations with Armenia have intersected with other events, such as the murder of the
Turkish-Armenian  journalist  Hrant  Dink  in  2007,  which  unleashed  a  powerful
emotional  reaction,  and  discussions  addressing  historical  issues,  such  as  the
deportations  and  massacres  of  the  Armenian  populations  in  1915,  that  have  been
increasingly engaged with across a variety of academic, media, publishing, and civil
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society  platforms.  Of  course,  this  shift  has  not  necessarily  been  translated  into  an
official recognition of the 1915 genocide, but it rather signals that the taboo of its dark
history has  been lifted (Insel  and Marian 2009).  In  2014,  for  the first  time in  state
history,  a  Turkish  Prime  Minister  offered  his  condolences  for  the  1915  Armenian
massacre.
25 Thus, sports diplomacy may appear to offer a means of endowing bilateral interstate
relationships with a more spectacular, publicised, and attractive dimension. At times,
this  may  also  go  further,  as  illustrated  by  the  signing  of  the  diplomatic  protocols
between Turkey and Armenia. However, the real scope of these diplomatic strategies is
dependent on both the political context and realpolitik.  in 2007, which unleashed a
powerful emotional reaction, and discussions addressing historical issues, such as the
deportations  and  massacres  of  the  Armenian  populations  in  1915,  that  have  been
increasingly engaged with across a variety of academic, media, publishing, and civil
society platforms. If sport mega-events have the potential to fulfil a comparable role in
diffusing beneficial images, this is not totally the same process as they are not bilateral
interstate relations.
 
II. Hosting sports mega-events as a means of
promoting a positive image abroad
26 In the last twenty years Turkey has dramatically increased both the number of sports
international events it has organised and the number of bids it has made to host sports
mega-events, such as the OG and the Football Euro. The impetus behind this process
has been initiated and predominantly driven by Turkish sports federations. Although
due to the large budgets, logistical support, and urban planning developments required
to host a mega-event,  very little can be achieved without strong local  and national
political backing. In this regard, there is a continual degree of overlap between the
political and sporting spheres of activity. Although the sports field has its own agendas
and interests, which may fit (or not) with political ones, hosting a mega-event requires
the  collusive  collaboration  of  both  sporting  elites  and  political  actors.  What  is  of
interest  in  the  bid  process  is  the  necessity  of  creating  an  imaginary  around  the
candidate city (or country) in order to persuade decision-makers. This refers both to
the  bid  content  and  the  technical  specificities  of  each  application,  and  also  to  the
symbolic images candidates wish to construct and communicate to an international
audience. Through a consideration of Turkey’s bids to host the Istanbul OG, it will be
argued that the process may be analysed as a branding strategy implemented through a
communication policy. At least between the 1990s and 2005, when the values of secular
republican political elites collided with those of sporting elites, the strategies aimed in
part to claim belonging to Europe. In an appraisal of the images promoted during the
candidacy for the 2020 OG, prepared under the auspices of the AKP government, the
comparative continuities and discontinuities of the bid process will be considered. The
paper will ask whether the 2020 bid was the product of foreign policy changes, and
whether its use of other images marked an attempt to redefine its values. However,
obtaining the OG or FIFA World Cup is dependent on the capacity of an applicant city to
attract  and  seduce  decision-makers,  i.e.  to secure  the  votes  of  the  International
Olympic Committee. In a sense, therefore, the bid process already constitutes a tangible
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means of measuring the perceived attractiveness of a country or, in other words, the
so-called “soft power” of a country.
 
International sports events in Turkey: A passport to Europe?
27 From the 1990s, hosting international sporting events has been a means of the Turkish
state,  founded  on  the  principles  of  “modernity,  secularism,  and  nationalism,”  to
demonstrate its modernity and organizational capabilities, and thus to legitimize its EU
candidacy. Prior to the 1980s, Turkey had only hosted wrestling competitions (in 1974
and 1977 respectively);  and perhaps unsurprisingly,  its  first  successful  bids were in
disciplines that are part of Turkish traditional sports practices and in which Turkish
athletes have a proven track record of success in (wrestling, weightlifting).9 However,
from the 1990s, as bids became progressively more frequent, the increasing diversity of
sports bids can be observed: not only sports which have a tangible international and
media  impact,  and  in  which  Turkey  has  begun  to  have  some  success  in  (football,
basketball),  but also in other disciplines (swimming, motor racing, archery, etc.).  To
date the most prestigious applications submitted by the Turkish state has been its bids
to host the Summer Olympic Games.
28 From 1992,  Istanbul has repeatedly bid to host the Olympic Games,  though without
success; Turkey was perhaps unlucky not to have been awarded the co-organisation
with Greece for the UEFA Euro 2008 and Euro 2016 Football Championships. Not all bids
have  been  unsuccessful:  In  2000,  Istanbul  hosted  the  thirty-fifth  European  Karate
Championships (EKF); in 2001, Turkey hosted the International Basketball Federation’s
(FIBA) European Basketball  Championships;  in 2005, Istanbul hosted the final of the
UEFA Champions League and the first Turkish Formula One Grand Prix; in 2010, it held
the FIBA World Basketball Championships and the Judo world championships; in 2011,
The  International  University  Sports  Federation  (FISU)  held  the  Winter  Universiade
(World Student Games) in Erzurum; between 2011 and 2013 Istanbul host the Women’s
Tennis  Association  Tennis  (WTA)  Tour  Championships;  in  2012,  the  International
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) World Indoor Championships in Athletics
was held in Istanbul followed by the Swimming World Championships (FINA); in 2013,
the  Mediterranean  Games  were  held  in  Mersin;  and  in  2014,  Turkey  hosted  the
Women’s Basketball World Championships. In addition, the European Capitals of Sport
Association (ACES) selected Istanbul as the European Capital of Sport in 2012.
29 Bids to host sports mega-events were initiated in the 1990s in the context of economic
growth and neo-liberalism alongside the emergence of powerful business groups with
the  financial  capacity  to  back  these  bids.  In  a  sense  these  bids  reflected  the  new
economic  potential  and  power  of  Turkey  in  the  1990s.  Turkey’s  numerous  bids  to
organize international sports events may be regarded as a means of demonstrating the
nation’s modernity and its organizational capabilities, and thus the legitimacy of its
application for EU membership. This strategy was particularly apparent in the period
prior  to  the  AKP’s  assumption of  power.  Candidate  for  EU membership  since  1987,
Turkey continues to claim its anchorage to the West, thereby pursuing the work of its
founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, this western polarization is questioned both
inside  and  outside  its  borders.  Although Turkey  applied  to  the  EU before  the  new
Eastern European members did, negotiations for its membership were formally opened
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only in October 2005, and are set to continue for a while, given the strong reluctance of
some member states (including France and Germany) to admit Turkey to the EU. 
30 International sports authorities, such as FIFA, UEFA and the IOC, define the application
criteria for candidate countries, including the quality of sports infrastructure, security,
communications  and  media,  financial  guarantees,  transport  system,  environmental
quality,  and  accommodation,  etc.  In  addition  to  the  more  technical  specifications,
which have a symbolic value insofar as they are an indicator of a country’s level of
development,  applicant countries are required to specify the particularities of  their
candidacy assets. For bidding cities, this presents an opportunity to build a vision of a
strong national identity in the image of the Olympic ideals. In this regard, the focus
placed on multicultural diversity was remarkable given the controversy surrounding
Turkey’s human and minority rights issues as grounds for contesting its EU candidacy.
The  values  of  tolerance  and  generosity  have  played  a  role  in  the  imaginative
construction of the country’s image by the Istanbul Olympic Bid Committee (IOBC), the
body with overall responsibility for the city’s candidacy. All Istanbul application files
have emphasised the city’s unique geographical location. From its first Olympic bid to
host the 2000 Olympic Games in 1994, Istanbul’s logo depicted two interlinked rings
with the slogan “The Meeting of the Continents” (although the logo was later changed
for the 2020 OG bid). The two rings invoked the stylised image of the Olympic rings to
represent  the  continents  of  Europe  and Asia  linked by  the  two Bosphorus  bridges.
Istanbul  was  thus  presented  as  a  metaphorical  “bridge  between  the  cultures  and
civilizations of Asia and Europe. […] It is a city of culture where religions and languages
have  merged  over  thousands  of  years  of  co-existence”.  The  bid  book  claimed  that
Istanbul “is home to 26 ethnic groups and its people speak ten different languages. The
very existence of “‘Olympist Istanbul’ is a challenge to prejudice and sectarian divide.”
10 It is of interest to note that these statements made at the end of the 1990s, sharply
diverged from the official state line towards multiculturalism, national belonging being
firmly situated in a homogenous conception of identity that failed to recognize ethnic
minorities. By insisting on diversity and pluralism, the authors of the Istanbul Olympic
bid were striving to portray an image of a peaceful and tolerant country.
31 Beyond its domestic audience, bids to host sports events also present an opportunity to
extend the image of peace to its regional neighbours. This was the goal of Turkey and
Greece’s unsuccessful joint bid in 2000 to host the Euro 2008.  In the context of the
complex and conflictual (if improving) relationship between Turkey and Greece, the
Turkey initiated  bid  was  represented as  the  inauguration of  a  new era  of  peaceful
cooperation  and  “greater  mutual  understanding”11 between  the  two  countries.
Following the example set by the 2002 FIFA World Cup Finals between Japan and Korea,
Şenes Erzik,  then FIFA executive committee member,  Korea-Japan World Cup Finals
Organization Committee member, and the Vice-President of UEFA , considered that the
event  “would help to  build  a  better  relationship between Turks  and Greeks.”12 The
Turkish Football Federation’s proposal to Greece in February 2000, was enthusiastically
accepted by the Greek Football Federation and supported by the foreign ministers of
both states. In under eighteen months, a joint bid committee was instituted to prepare
the official bid for submission to UEFA in November 2001. The change of parliamentary
majority following the first AKP victory in the general election, of November 2002, did
little to change the political momentum behind the project. On the contrary, just days
after  the  AKP’s  historic  victory,  Erdoğan  delivered  a  speech  to  UEFA  members  to
coincide with the selection day for the Euro 2008 host nation. However, it is interesting
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here to distinguish the political support to host Euro 2008 from the bilateral diplomatic
use of sport described above. Euro 2008 was initiated exclusively by sports elites and
the  Turkish  Football  Federation  who  reasoned  that  they  stood  a  better  chance  of
securing the Euro through a joint bid with Greece. Reconciliation with Greece was not
viewed  as  a  politically  invested  endeavour,  but  was  rather  a  means  of  lending  a
symbolic dimension to the bid. Of course, politicians lent their support, however they
did so while remaining largely in the background. Despite some persisting diplomatic
disputes with Greece over the status of Cyprus and Aegean rivalry, the continuity of
relations between Turkey and Greece has never been seriously interrupted.  Indeed,
Greece even supported Turkey’s  EU membership.  Turkish sports  bids thus strive to
promote the image of Turkey as a European country on the verge of becoming an EU
member:  “At present,  Istanbul is  the largest  city in a country that is  preparing for
membership of the EU” (Bid document for the 2008 Olympic Games). 
32 Finally,  hosting  an  international  sports  event,  or  the  victories  of  Turkish  teams in
international events,  are presented and celebrated as true national successes,  and a
step closer to Europe: “Now, we are Europeans!” claimed Turkey’s former President,
Suleyman Demirel when Galatasaray won the UEFA Cup in 2000 (Sonntag June 9, 2000).
Indeed,  these  victories  are  all  the  more  so  celebrated  precisely  because  of  their
achievement on the sports field. According to Ehrenberg (1991), the sports field is a
condensation of the democratic society ideal in which competition is equal and the
winner is the best. In other words, sport establishes a hierarchy based on merit rather
than on human ranking or categorisation. The focus of Turkey’s policy is based on the
understanding that through sporting successes the nation can achieve the European
recognition it so desires, even while the European political system continues to refuse
it.
33 If sport is considered only as a means of diplomatic action, or as an instrument serving
political strategies or ideologies, then a full comprehension of the complex relationship
that exists between sport and politics in Turkey would be neglected. Of course, political
actors have to refer to sport: Sport is a valuable political resource. Sport can glorify
youth, – one of the most popular themes of the young Turkish Republic – and facilitate
patriotism in a country where May 19, is a national day for “sport and youth,” with
ceremonies organized in stadiums full of children, featuring poems and speeches made
in honour of the glory of young people, the Republic and Atatürk (Yurdsever 2003). The
political  authorities  in  Turkey have always supported bids  and tried to  profit  from
victories,  whether they are derived from sporting victories achieved on the field or
from the victories won through hosting sports events. However, sport is not utilized by
Turkey in the same way and to the same extent as it was in the former Soviet Union or
in  China  for  example.  Even  if  the  relationship  between  sport  and  politics  is  a
particularly  entangled  one  in  Turkey,  it  cannot  be  merely  reduced  to  a  politically
exploitative one. 
34 Sporting  elites  are  closely  interrelated  with  the  political  elite,  sharing  the  same
republican values, at least prior to the AKP’s assumption of power, and possessing the
implicit knowledge that they can draw support from them. This phenomenon blurs the
lines between sport and politics in Turkey. Sporting elites acknowledge that they want
their  teams  to  win  competitions,  but  that  they  also  want  to  see  Turkey  become a
member of the EU. Demirel’s exclamation following Galatasary’s UEFA Cup Final victory
is  not  an  isolated  example,  but  an  assumption  commonly  shared  by  sporting  and
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political elites: “now, I hope you understand that we are Europeans!” claimed Sinan
Erdem  the  president  of  Turkish  National  Olympic  Committee  (TNOC)  following  a
traditional Turkish dinner (with fish and rakı) to IOC members during an official visit to
Istanbul in 2000. 
35 However,  even  if  sporting  elites  believe  that  their  sports  project  will  prove
advantageous to Turkey’s application for EU membership, they are more often than not
convinced to the contrary that the opposite is likely: Barcelona and Athens hosted the
Olympic Games only after their acceptance into the EU (six years later for Spain, and 22
years later for Greece). However, focusing on the country’s political image is a strategic
way  of  realising  other  specific  goals,  such  as  the  agenda  of  supporting  sports
development in Turkey. Istanbul’s bidding efforts are also a means of building national
sporting infrastructure, as defined by the IOBC, the General Directorate of Youth and
Sports, and the Greater Istanbul Municipality, as well as by private bodies. Through
urban policy-making, Turkey has been able to attain European standards in terms of its
infrastructural  development,  and  to  subsequently  justify  expenditure  in  this  area.
Sporting elites  also  aspire  to  promote  sport  among young people,  not  only  from a
health perspective, but with the aim of producing a future generation of champions.
Sporting elites consider themselves to be the vanguard of sport, using sport to build the
image of a modern Turkey in order to procure vital support and financial investment
from  political  elites  for  the  proposal  of  serious  bids  to  host  international  sports
competitions.  Furthermore,  the  sports  sector  draws  important  benefits  from  the
support of political elites. An astonishing example of the extensity of goodwill towards
sport is manifest in the Turkish Olympic Law. Istanbul’s Olympic bid is endorsed by a
special law, near-unanimously passed by the national parliament in April 1992, making
Turkey the first (and so far only) country to have enacted a legal instrument in its
support. The Turkish Olympic Law (No. 3796) established the Istanbul Olympic Games
Preparation and Organisation Council (IOBC,) and authorised it to “take all necessary
action in the pursuit and organisation of the Games”; and “recognises and respects the
supremacy of the IOC in all Olympic matters”. The law requires all public institutions
and agencies, including local government bodies, to give “priority to the requests of the
IOBC  in  relation  to  the  pursuit  and  organisation  of  the  Games”.  The  Olympic  Law
guarantees a continuous flow of funds for the pursuit and organisation of the Games. It
is also of interest to note here that this law was devised and prepared thanks to the
strength of relationship between Sinan Erdem, president of  the TNOC, and Erdoğan
Teziç, the famous lawyer, Chancellor of Galatasaray University, and latter day president
of the Council of Higher Education [Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK]. Both were graduates of
the  renowned  Galatasaray  High  School  [Galatasaray  Lisesi]  and  the  Faculty  of  Law,
Istanbul  University.  Sinan Erdem, who went on to become a professional  volleyball
player and captain of  the national  team, coached Erdoğan Teziç  during his  time at
Galatasaray. Both individuals belong to the Kemalist elite and share the political project
of the westernization of Turkey. Beyond the pursuit of their own interests, political and
sport  elites  shared  the  same  vision  throughout  this  period:  To  be  recognised  as
Europeans and to strengthen the European identity of Turkey. It could be asserted that
the bid process constitutes a political claim for recognition and Turkey’s acceptance as
an equal by their Europeans counterparts.
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Istanbul 2020 Olympic Games: A sports mega-event to celebrate the
“new Turkey”?
36 The Istanbul 2020 Olympic Games bid will be addressed through the analyses of the bid
book, published in January 2013, and the personal observations that were carried out
during  the  IOC  delegation’s  assessment  visit  to  Istanbul  in  March  2013.  It  will  be
demonstrated that although the 2020 Istanbul bid retained the use of the majority of
images and symbols and was very much in line with previous bids, subtle changes can
be  observed.  These  points  of  divergence  require  contextualizing  within  a  broader
perspective of the images that the government intended to promote over its decade in
power, claiming the rise of the news power of Turkey.
37 Followings its failed candidacy attempts to host the 2012 OG (awarded to London), the
TNOC took the pragmatic decision to postpone its next bid until the 2020 OG, based on
the  rule  of  rotating  continents  every  Olympiad  and its  assessed  need to  prepare  a
flawless application.13 The Istanbul 2020 OG bid, the fifth consecutive bid to be made
after the 2000 OG, was indeed the best presentation given to date due to the strength of
its candidacy assets. As a result of the Olympic Law, Istanbul has been equipped with
modern sports venues in accordance with IOC requirements. Since the last candidacy
for the 2012 OG presented in 2005, the TNOC underwent a series of significant changes.
The  former  TNOC  President  (1989-2003)  and  spiritual  father  of  the  Istanbul  OG
candidacies, Sinan Erdem,14 passed away in 2003. Erdem was the man responsible for
initiating this (his) dream of the Istanbul OG.15 His same generation successor left his
post in 2011 to be replaced by the President of the World Archery Federation, Uğur
Erdener. During this period, Turkey enjoyed a sustained period of economic growth and
relative  political  stability  with  the  AKP  continuing  to  retain  its  position  of  power
following its successive electoral successes from 2002.
38 In November 2009, the head of the International Sports Organisation of the Turkish
Republic and senior consultant to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced
that Istanbul would bid for the 2020 OG. It was officially confirmed by Erdoğan himself
in July 2011, during a speech presented before a cheering crowd of more than 20,000 to
mark  the  opening  of  the  European  Youth  Olympic  Festival.  An  initial  appraisal  of
Erdoğan’s  declarations  and  the  Istanbul  bid  book  results  in  the  observation  of
comparable  themes to earlier  bids,  however,  closer  attention reveals  an alternative
tone. For instance, in a jointly signed letter by the Prime Minister, the President of the
Republic, and the Minister of Youth and Sports, addressed to the IOC President in the
introduction  of  the  Istanbul  bid  book,  reiterates  that  Tukey  is  “a  democratic  and
modern  nation  with  its  ongoing  European  Union  Candidature  negotiations.”16 The
location of the city is restated as the point where the “East literally meets West [in our
city],  where  Europe  and  Asia  are  metropolitan  suburbs,  separated  only  by  the
spectacular waters of the Bosphorus.” According to a journalist specializing in sports
events, the Istanbul bid book does the best to embrace 
…  the  jargonistic  and  portentous  lingua  franca  of  the  Olympic  Movement.  […]
Within a few pages of the first volume, it has seamlessly interwoven an array of
phrases and ideas that sum up why taking its flagship product to Istanbul is such a
tempting idea for the Olympic Movement. “The first-ever Games host in the Muslim
world;” Turkey’s Olympic law “in place now for 20 years;” the potential for sponsors in
“leveraging  a  spectacular  city;”  “Europe’s  youngest  population.”  All  are phrases  just
crying  out  to  be  highlighted  in  fluorescent  marker  pen.  And  then  there  is  the
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obvious point  about the city  being where Europe meets  Asia  (Owen January 13,
2013).
39 Yet, what these ironic remarks fail to comprehend is the emphasis placed on the new
power of Turkey. The Istanbul 2020 bid book claims that “This bid holds a unique place
within  the  vision  of  the  new  Turkey  and  the  region’s  development.”17 This  “new
Turkey” referred firstly to its economic growth: 
Turkey has made great strides in all fields in recent years. Significant reform and
stability  have  strengthened  our  large  and  expanding  economy.  Our  record  of
economic growth continues in spite of the ongoing impacts of the global crises for
our region.18
40 Furthermore, the bid book develops an argument which aims to prove the financial
viability of the delivery of the Games: 
Driven  by  a  stable  democracy  and  economic  growth  averaging  5.2%  annually
between 2002 and 2011 (more than three and a half times Europe’s average for the
period),  the  visionary  2023  Master  Plan  for  Turkey  has  been  delivering
transformational development in Istanbul’s physical and social landscape for the
last  five years.  Already billions of  dollars have been invested in programmes to
deliver Istanbul’s new transport network for the twenty-first century, with further
major investment programmed to 2020. These and other development programmes
will  drive,  and  in  turn  be  accelerated  by,  the  Games.  The  city  has  become  a
multinational financial and enterprise hub. With its stock market growing by 26%
in 2012 and foreign direct investment in the city jumping 110% in 2011, Istanbul is
the financial capital of a Turkish economy forecast to be in the world’s top 10 by
2023 (ranked by GDP).19
41 The use of economic statistics not only evidences Turkey’s low-risk delivery strategy,
but also enables Turkey to play a broader role in the region: 
The  momentum  of  Istanbul’s  development  fuelled  by  Turkey’s  prosperity  and
youthful  populace,  offers  the  Olympic  and  Paralympic  Movements  a  number  of
long-term strategic, commercial and operational benefits. The Olympic objective of
universality will be reinforced by embracing the Muslim culture, adding distinctive
value to the Olympic and Paralympic brands, as a new chapter in Games history is
opened.  Benefits  will  also arise  from Istanbul’s  status as  a  multinational  hub of
business,  sport  and culture for  markets  in  Eastern Europe,  the Middle East  and
Africa, enabling penetration into new and sustainable markets.20
42 Finally, the decision to change Istanbul’s logo, was unveiled by the Prime Minister in
July  2012,  may  also  be  invoked  as  indicative  of  the  shifting  uses  of  images.  In
comparison to the former logo, which underlined the geographical position of Istanbul,
the new logo, allegedly chosen by popular vote from a selection of five alternatives,
combines  a  tulip  with  the  world-famous  skyline  of  Istanbul  to  encompass  its
monuments and mosques. 
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43 Hasan Arat, leader of Istanbul 2020, stated his belief that the new logo metaphorically
symbolizes what Istanbul is capable of offering the Olympic Movement: 
A  vibrant  and young nation,  a  bridge  between Europe  and Asia,  a  modern and
spectacular setting steeped in history – these are the ideas we wanted the Istanbul
2020 Candidate City logo to represent and our people have not let us down with
their vote. Our new logo has been chosen by Turkey’s young population to act as a
symbol of inspiration for our Olympic dream. (Gamesbids July 22, 2012) 
44 It  is  significant  to  recognise  the  performative  role  of  the  motif  of  the  tulip  as  an
evocative reference to a symbol of the Ottoman period, and the annual International
Tulip Festival organized by the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul.
45 Thus,  the  Istanbul  2020  Olympic  Games  has  been  represented  by  the  political
authorities as a constitutive element of the momentum towards Turkey’s destiny, its
grandeur,  and  its  renaissance  as  they  “prepare  to  celebrate  the  centenary  of  the
Republic in 2023.”21 During the IOC evaluation visit in March 2013, the Istanbul Olympic
Bid Committee invested a comparable level of confidence in its Istanbul bid thanks to
its  new  role  in  the  region.  From  discussions with  international  journalists who
followed the IOC’s delegation visits to the three candidate cities, it became clear that
some of them found the Turkish presentation to be too austere and even a little bit
arrogant. An impression was imparted that the Turkish authorities were publicising a
message that suggested any decision other than a favourable result for Turkey would
not only be an incomprehensible injustice, but might even be received as a humiliation
for the wider Muslim world.
46 It is important to bear in mind that Turkey invested substantial resources in its bid to
convince IOC members of its intended new regional and international role. Sporting
elites and political authorities have actively promoted Turkey broadly, and the Istanbul
2020 OG specifically through the numerous international trips that were undertaken
between  2012  and  2013  (New  York,  Saint  Petersburg,  Dakar,  Abidjan,  Doha,  Paris,
Barcelona, etc.). Turkey’s ability to develop an ambitious foreign policy and to extend
the reach of its influence, particularly in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, is
largely a result of its economic prosperity. In Africa, for example, Turkey has opened
more than twenty new embassies since 2009, and Turkish Airlines currently operates
services to 28 African countries. Turkey has become a solid investor in the continent as
well  as  a  generous  donor  for  humanitarian  crises.  In  2013,  Erdoğan visited  several
African countries, such as Niger, Gabon, Senegal (in January), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco
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(in  June),  accompanied  by  businesspeople  and  journalists.  Although  primarily
motivated by political and economic concerns, the trips have also served to promote
Turkey abroad. However,  when a Turkish delegation travelled to the Ivory Coast to
attend the General  Assembly of  the Association of  National  Olympic  Committees  of
Africa  (ANOCA)  in  July  2013,  the  aims  of  the  visit  were  far  more  transparent.  The
Turkish delegation was led by the Istanbul Bid Committee Chairman and the President
and Secretary General of the TNOC. The delegates were accompanied by the former
Ambassador of the Turkish Republic for Cameroon (also advisor to the Istanbul 2020
Bid  Committee)  and  the  Ambassador  of  the  Turkish  Republic  for  the  Ivory  Coast.
Speaking before travelling to Abidjan, the Istanbul Bid Committee Chairman asserted
with the intonation of a third world leader that: 
Istanbul  is  in  a  region  that  has  never  hosted  the  Games,  just  like  Africa.  We
understand the challenges of African sport – and we understand the huge ambition
of other nations that have not hosted the Games. In the city where the continents
meet, Istanbul 2020 will meet that ambition and help connect Africa with the full
power of  the  Olympic  Movement… Istanbul  2020 is  committed to  providing the
most comprehensive support package for National Olympic Committees and their
teams. For the first time in Olympic history, every athlete from every nation will
have access to a free-to-use Olympic Training Precinct and Recovery Centre on the
same site as the Olympic Village. So in Istanbul, the sportsmen and women of Africa
will have a better chance of realising their full potential than ever before – perhaps
the best chance they will have until the Games come to the continent. (Sportcal July
10, 2013)
47 This statement well illustrates the strategic use of Turkey’s new foreign policy in the
service of Istanbul 2020.
48 While it is commonly assumed that the Olympics are an instrument of “soft power”
(which has yet to be demonstrated), the question remains whether the impact of this
new Turkish foreign policy can be measured through its ability to promote and bring
the Games to Istanbul? The rapid analysis and interpretation of the awarding process
for the 2020 Olympics may provide guidance as to the scope of this new foreign policy.
In other words, before we can regard the Olympics as an instrument of soft power, the
question firstly needs to be asked whether the award of the OG in itself is a tangible
indicator of this so-called soft power.
49 Evaluation of Istanbul’s 2020 candidacy, which had many points in its favour, was well
documented in the IOC delegation report, released in April 2013. Firstly, the IOC, ever
eager to embrace the “new world” in the image of Beijing 2008 and Rio 2016, cast a
watchful eye over the candidacy of an applicant Muslim country, aware that very few
major sporting events had been held in the region.22 The IOC delegation stressed the 
quality of the application, an impression shared by other state observers, such as the
UK and Greece who announced their support for Istanbul 2020. Since its release ten
years ago, the internet website Games BidIndex has become the “industry standard”
measurement of  the competitiveness  of  OG bids.23 For  example,  in  the last  two bid
campaigns, BidIndex correctly gauged the successful outcomes of Olympic host cities
Rio de Janeiro and Pyeongchang. In February 2013, Istanbul was ranked slightly ahead
of Tokyo in first place: Istanbul’s high score (61.78, up 1.58 points) was calculated on a
combination of over 100 fundamental evaluations carried out by BidIndex. Highlighted
among  them  was  Turkey’s  strong  economic  growth  compared  to  its  rivals  and
Istanbul’s  Olympic  bidding  experience  that  had  included  four  recent  campaigns.
Istanbul also demonstrated strong public support coming from a country and region
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that had “never hosted an Olympic Games” (Gamesbids February 28, 2013). Thus, at the
beginning of 2013, Istanbul’s was tipped as the favourite nation to host the 2020 Games.
50 However, the choice of an Olympic city is a combination of factors outside the pure
rationality  of  the  inherent  quality  of  a  candidate  city’s  application  file.  Beyond
unofficial  rankings  and official  reports,  it  is  ultimately  the  IOC members  who vote
according to their personal convictions. Obviously there are strong political pressures,
the  risk  of  corruption  exists,  and  until  the  last  moment  uncertainty  remains  a
considerable factor.24 On September 7, 2013, in Buenos Aires, the CIO elected the city to
host the 2020 OG. After defeating Madrid to reach the final round, Istanbul lost the final
ballot  to  Tokyo  by  60  votes  to  36.  The  results  of  the  IOC  vote  is  indicative  of  the
persuasive power of Tokyo’s proposal. Of course, it is very difficult to point out with
any certainty the reasons behind the failure of  the Istanbul  bid,  and it  will  not  be
attempted here. The comparative successes and failures of various other previous bid
applications have shown the demonstrative need for candidate cities to expand their
sphere  of  influence  in  the  international  arena  and  position  their  country  in
international  sporting  bodies,  including  in  the  IOC.  Despite  the  considerable
mobilization of resources and the support of the political authorities and sports elites
to launch an effective lobbying campaign – and indeed despite being tipped as host
favourites  during  the  selection  process  –  the  Istanbul  bid  resulted  in  a  heavy  loss
during the final round. This failure may appear to constitute a genuine deficit of “soft
power”; a failure of capacity to capably convince IOC members to vote for Istanbul. The
failure  of  successive  Turkish  bids  to  host  sports  mega-events  often evokes  a  bitter
response from those involved in the projects (Polo 2012b). The failure of Istanbul 2020
was  received  with  great  resentment,  particularly  as  Erdoğan  had  been  so  publicly
engaged in supporting the bid.  Never before had a Turkish Prime Minister been so
personally involved in fostering a bid for a sport event.25 Following the domestic and
international  turmoil  of  2013,  the  attribution  of  OG  to  Istanbul  would  have  been
celebrated as a personal victory for Erdoğan, evidence that under his leadership Turkey
had been successfully guided into occupying a new position on the world stage. His
involvement in the biding process may explain why for the first time in its history the
Istanbul Olympic bid was no longer the consensus dream it had previously been (Polo,
2011).  The urban projects behind the Olympic bid had already generated a negative
backlash from the AKP’s hard-line critics in Turkey.26 In the wake of the Gezi events,
opponents  rallied  against  Erdoğan’s  authoritarianism.  Some  organizations  even
“requested the IOC to take Istanbul off of the list of cities for the 2020 Olympics in order
to reclaim the honour of  Olympic ideals.”27 Even commentators who had supported
Istanbul 2020 worried about the impact of the Games on Istanbul.28 When the results
were  announced  during  the  ceremony  in  Buenos  Aires,  the  Turkish  delegation
remained  seated,  utterly  dejected.  Then,  Erdoğan  stood  up,  hugged  his  Japanese
counterpart warmly and said, “We shall win [next time], God willing.” However, later,
he told the Turkish media that “it hasn’t been fair: In a way, they are cutting ties with
the  1.5  billion  people  of  the  Muslim  world”  (Today’s  Zaman September  10,  2013).
Erdoğan’s  statement  conveys  the  feeling  of  Turkey’s  isolation  and  its  paradoxical
dilemma: Not European enough to be accepted into Europe, and not enough powerful to
be persuasive. He also vehemently criticized the Turkish media and social networks,
accusing them of ensuring Istanbul lost its bid to host the 2020 Olympics.29
51 Unlike bilateral sports diplomacy, the impact of major sporting events are more diffuse
and uncertain. If the application process highlights the number of symbolic values a
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country is expected to embody, then its real impact is difficult to measure. In addition,
being awarded a sports mega-event like the Olympic Games implicitly means that the
country already has the strength and means of persuasion beyond traditional spheres
of influence.  The first  Olympic bids submitted by the TNOC were initiated by elites
wholly committed to the achievement of EU member status to consolidate Turkey’s
European identity, an ideal to which the Kemalist elites were so attached. Istanbul’s
2020  bid  can  be considered  to  have  occurred  in  a  very  different  context.  Turkey’s
externally  projected  image  changed  as  the  result  of  intersecting  non-hierarchical
factors: Firstly, greater economic prosperity provided the means for the development
of  a  new  foreign  policy  that  has  sought  to  establish  Turkey’s  regional  influence,
including the former territories of  the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world;  and
secondly, the difficult progress of EU accession negotiations was exacerbated by the
opposition of some European member states and Turkey’s slow pace of reforms towards
the fulfilment of membership criteria. The Olympic Games in Istanbul could have been
a way of symbolically demonstrating to Europe Turkey’s continued movement towards
its destiny, regardless of the lack of progress in the EU negotiation process.
 
Conclusion
52 Over the last twenty years, the political use of sport in Turkey has been integrated into
an influence-building diplomacy to foster a positive image abroad. From 2000, sports
diplomacy, alongside other diplomatic instruments, have participated in a new AKP-
driven foreign policy, such as the international cooperation policy (instituted through
TIKA,  the  Turkish  International  Cooperation  and  Development  Agency),  and  an
external  cultural  policy (implemented through the opening of  Yunus Emre cultural
centres in 28 countries). At home this policy has sought to disseminate an image of the
nation in multiple ways:  As a benevolent country and regional  power served by an
ambitious foreign policy, as a country with a dynamic economy and a strong stable
government,  and  as  a  modern  state  sustained  by  its  commitment  to  conservative
values. In the aftermath of the Arab revolts in the early 2010s, Turkey paraded itself,
and was  correspondingly  vaunted abroad,  as  a  political  model  of  the  ideal  modern
state, which had succeeded in successfully combining democracy with Islamic values.
Particularly in the period after 2013, faced with a series of domestic and international
setbacks the country’s weaknesses were revealed through political developments that
somewhat served to tarnish its image. 
53 This is probably the point at which the limits of public diplomacy and sports diplomacy
are reached. It is absolutely clear that states try to use sport for political purposes.
Major sporting events, particularly those that can be considered truly mega-events by
virtue  of  their  exceptional  scale  and global  impact,  namely  the  Olympics  and FIFA
World Cup, receive absolute government backing. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to
measure  the  actual  effects  of  sports  diplomacy  beyond  the  declarations  made  by
political authorities through communication policies and media coverage.
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(Today’s Zaman September 10, 2013). “Erdoğan: İstanbul rejection as 2020 host was unfair,” Today’s
Zaman. URL: http://www.todayszaman.com/sports_erdogan-i-stanbul-rejection-as-2020-host-
was-unfair_325921.html. 
Ünal, Mustafa (September 6, 2008). “‘Yerevan visit to boost Turkey’s image’,” Today’s Zaman. URL: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_yerevan-visit-to-boost-turkeys-image_152331.html.
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1. See, for example, Politix, « Sport et politique », vol. 13, n° 50, 2000. URL : http://www.persee.fr/
issue/polix_0295-2319_2000_num_13_50 ;  Géopolitique,  Revue  de  l’Institut  international  de
géopolitique,  « Sport  et  politique »,  n° 66,  juillet  1999 ;  Relations  internationales,  « Olympisme et
Relations  internationales »,  n° 111  et  112,  automne  et  hiver  2002 ;  Bulletin  d’Histoire  politique,
« Sport  et  politique »,  vol. 11,  n° 2,  hiver  2003 ;  Sport  in  Society,  17(9),  2014.  There  are  also
numerous articles  in international  reviews such as the International  Journal  of  Sport  Policy  and
Politics ; The International Journal of the History of Sport ; and Sport in Society.
2. The reasons behind the decision to compete to host sport mega-events, such as the anticipated
positive impacts on the local community and regional economy, or in terms of urban planning
and regeneration, remain of course, fiercely debated (see Horne and Manzenreiter 2006; Murray
and Pigman 2014) and will not be addressed in this paper.
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3. For Manzenreiter although the “Beijing Games offered an excellent opportunity to promote
China to the world, there was less consent with regard to the way this could have been achieved.
Instead the vast  majority  of  attention and effort  [of  the Chinese authorities]  focused on the
domestic audience” (Manzenreiter 2010 :  33).  The sans faute of the Sotchi OG did not prevent
Putin’s use of hard power when Russia annexed Crimea four months later.
4. For Hall “In fact to criticize the hosting of mega-events as an economic and social development
mechanism is to be doubly damned. For one contends not only with the neoliberal discourse of
competition and the relentless pursuit of regeneration but also with the mythologies of the social
benefits of sport. Sport is extremely hard to argue against” (Hall 2006 : 67).
5. At the end of May 2013, a wave of demonstrations contesting the urban development plan for
Istanbul’s  Taksim Gezi  Park sparked widespread protests  in  Istanbul  and across  Turkey.  The
Police suppressed the protests with tear gas and water cannons; eleven people were killed and
more than a thousand were injured. The excessive use of force by the police alongside the overall
absence of government dialogue with the protesters was criticized by some foreign countries and
international organisations.
6. Syria was a strictly controlled country under Assad with tight security control over its social
and political groups and public space. It was therefore apparent that supporters had been invited
to celebrate the match at the behest of the leadership.
7. URL: http://www.peace-sport.org/images/pdf/PEACEANDSPORTAWARDS2008_ENG.PDF.
8. Cf. Goksel (2009); see also Galstyan (2011).
9. Thirty-six out of the thirty-eight gold medals won by Turkish sportsmen at the OG were in
these sports (twenty-eight just for wrestling).
10. Istanbul 2008, Application file, p. 2.
11. Bid Document Greece-Turkey Euro 2008, p. 24.
12. Interview, Istanbul, January 2003.
13. Interview, Istanbul, May 2008.
14. Between  1957  and  1967,  Sinan  Erdem  served  as  the  secretary  general  of  the  Turkish
Volleyball  Federation.  In 1966,  he became member of  the International  Volleyball  Federation
(FIVB) and served as the head of the organization committee of FIVB between 1972 and 1984. He
was the deputy secretary general of the Turkish National Olympic Committee (TMOK) from 1975,
before serving as the secretary general from 1982 to 1989. In 1989, Sinan Erdem was appointed
chairman of the TMOK.
15. Interview, Istanbul, January 2002.
16. Istanbul 2020 bid book, vol. 1, p. 5. 





22. The  choice  of  Qatar  to  host  the  FIFA  World  Cup  in  2022  has  been  the  subject  of  much
controversy, including amongst others, corruption charges and the bad working conditions of
workers who build the stadiums. The debate that has surrounded the decision is demonstrative
of the considerable damage that can be done to the image of a country awarded the responsibility
for organizing a sports mega-events, that is to say, selection does not systematically produce
positive effects.
23. URL: http://www.gamesbids.com/eng/. 
24. The allocation of the 2012 Olympic Games to London over Paris would have been won at the
hotel and before the vote, thanks to the leading role played by then British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, who put his political weight behind the campaign in the final straights.
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25. Beyond making numerous trips abroad, Erdoğan flew from Ankara to Istanbul to host an IOC
delegation dinner at the historic Esma Sultan Mansion next to the Bosphorus in Ortaköy in an
effort to show his support for Istanbul’s bid and land the 2020 Olympic Games (Hürriyet Daily News
March 27, 2013). 
26. Former UN Special  Reporter  on the  Right  to  Adequate  Housing,  Miloon Kothari,  visiting
Istanbul in March 2013, invited by the Istanbul Chamber of architects [TMMOB Mimarlar Odası],
stated that the “Olympics would be a disaster for Istanbul” (İnce April 1, 2013).
27. The Urban Movements Istanbul,  Habitat International Network, and the Istanbul People’s
Houses wrote a letter addressed to IOC members denouncing the repression of the Gezi protests
and  the  Urban  projects  initiated  in  the  name  of  the  Olympic  Games,  see  URL:  http://
www.sendika9.org/2013/06/this-is-an-urgent-call-to-the-international-olympic-committee-ioc-
from-istanbul/. 
28. Thus, the secularist newspaper Cumhuriyet ran an article titled “Yes to the Olympics, no to
looting” [Olympiyata evet, yağmaya hayır], Cumhuriyet, August 9, 2013, p. 9.
29. See pro-government newspapers such as Star, Yeni Şafak, Akşam, Haber Türk in their editions of
September 9, 2013.
ABSTRACTS
For the first time in its fifteen years of brilliant yet unsuccessful candidacies to host the Olympic
Games (OG) and the Football European Championships (Euro), Turkey was admitted into the elite
group of countries capable of staging sports mega-events. Although it failed in the last round for
the 2020 OG (beaten by Tokyo in 2013), and for the Euro 2016 (beaten by France in 2010), it has
since been tipped as the strong favourite to host Euro 2024. International matches have been
simultaneously utilized by the Turkish government as an opportunity to publicly demonstrate its
willingness to resolve historically problematic issues with other countries. In this paper, it will be
argued  that  Turkey’s  ambitions  to  host  sports  mega-events  and  its  politicization  of  specific
matches can be interpreted as a strategy of the state to diffuse a positive image at home and
abroad, and consolidate its role in the region. A distinction will  be made between the use of
sport, more accurately football matches, as a tool of diplomacy (in which the state remains the
main actor of the process in the context of bilateral relationships) and the use of sports events,
which includes also the involvement of sports actors for more diffuse ends. Rather than referring
to the concept of soft power, the notion of sport diplomacy will be utilised to analyse Turkey’s
influence through the strategic use of sport. Specifically, through the comparative analysis of
successive bid proposals to host the Istanbul Games, the AKP’s strategy to promote Turkey’s new
power will be critically appraised.
INDEX
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